even after the lady had gone to court, in this case to the "Tribunal de Première Instance". Even the intervention of the Minister of Home Affairs, a powerful man with whom the lady in question was acquainted through other acquaintances, did not help her. As a last resort, she had turned to the head of state, General Gnassingbé Eyadéma, who has made a habit of lending a ready ear to anyone who has a problem (van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1987 a). All her peregrinations through the official channels had proved fruitless and the "criminal" continued to drive around in the lorry.
Her husband, on the other hand, had adopted a different approach following the theft of a number of surfboards ("What the hell are they going to do with them?"). He had gone to the local chief, and had actually recovered the majority of the stolen goods by the village council. He had a self-satisfied look on his face that seemed to be saying: "That's the way to deal with these people here. That's how you get results!"
The above is a concise version of the story, which I have condensed for reasons of space. Moreover, I am aware that I am comparing two disputes which are about two fundamentally different matters: a failure to repay a loan and a theft of property. After all, by African standards, a loan is an expression of a two-way relationship. People do not generally expect lenders to demand repayment of a loan at short notice, particularly if the borrowers are not evidently suffering as a result of the non-repayment. In such a case, taking steps to secure the recovery of a loan is nothing more than the expression of a desire to end a social relationship ( Baerends & van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1982) . Such an action may even be regarded as being socially reprehensible, and no-one is prepared to be seen as being responsible, even partially responsible, for ending a relationship in this way. This is certainly not the case if important people are involved. On the other hand, infringing a person's property rights by committing theft is regarded as being an entirely different matter demanding a suitable reaction.
My primary concern is not the apparent lack of efficacy of the modern judicial system and government authority in African countries,like Togo, which has already been abundantly described by others (Bgoya & Hyden, 1987; Jackson & Rosberg, 1985; Myrdal, 1968; Spittler, 1981) . This article concerns the balance of power between two actors: on the one hand the Togolese State and on the other hand the Togolese chieftaincy. I consider this balance of power as a "zero-sum game", which means that the expansion of the power of the State, nearly always is at the expense of the other, the chief (2). It is, however, not always very evident how action fields in which both actors act, are separated from each other. Sometimes they are not separated at all, but are even overlapping. Both actors try to enhance their influence and power; they resist vehemently, in different ways, to an attack of their power. Due to the zero-sum game, both actors have only one possibility: to fight each other trying to consolidate their own position. II none of the actors would consolidates his position and accept a status-quo there will be no competition what-so-ever. Their relationship will be clear and stable; there will be a kind of equilibrium. But as soon as one of the actors tries to enhance his influence and therefore his power, it will be at the expense of the stability. There will be instability. The zero-sum game does not only mean an enhancement of the power of one of the actors, but also a threat to the other's position (van Laar, 1991) .
On the other hand, how contradictory it may be, there is also an interdependency between the state and the chief. This interdependency causes the risk that, if one of the actors uses his indispensability, it enhances his power. The state is dependent on the chief in fulfilling its policy, but the state is also dependent on the chief to get specific information concerning the local community of the chief concerned. The state badly needs this inside information to execute its legal, administrative and economic policy. At the other hand, the chief too needs the support of the central government to legitimate his power and to get economical favours which he can distribute to his people. This interdependency has its own dynamics and is a colourful pallet for socio-political research.
Let me summarize shortly: the relationship between the African state and its traditional counterpart, the chief, has two characteristics: competition and interdependency. Both actors try to enhance their influence and their power always at the expense of the other. That is competition. But still, they need each other mutually and in that way they depend on each other.
The arrival of the colonial regime, France, changed basically the indigenous balance of power and introduced not only a new political leadership and authority in Togo, but also a concept of state with the centralization of power and bureaucratization (3) -two important attributes of a state -in which the exercise of power and violence is one of the prerogatives, or even the monopoly of the state and its political institutions (4). This legitimate monopoly of state violence, which has been already a rich field of research interest for political scientists and sociologists as well, seems to me also an interesting research item for legal anthropologists.
One has to admit, however, that up till now, the state's monopoly of violence, and the state in general, have received little attention in legal anthropological research and theory. In classical legal anthropological studies, such as Gluckman (1955) , Bohannan (1968), and Holleman (1969) , and many others, the state figured mainly as an ideal type of political organization, often in an evolutionary perspective, which the tribal and village peoples in Africa had not yet attained. In the period of field work in colonial setting, the presence of the state was largely ignored. The state appeared on the scene of research during the phase in which legal anthropology, at least English and American anthropology, was largely reduced to the study of dispute settlement processes. Gradually, research moved away from the study of tribal and village processes to include also procedures in colonial ornational state courts. Under the label of "selective use of legal systems", "forum shopping", or more generally speaking of "legal and institutional pluralism" state courts and administrative institutions and state law became subjects on the legal anthropological research agenda (von Benda-Beckmann, 1990 ). At first this was confined to the context of dispute behaviour, but during the last twenty years there is an increasing interest to other fields of social activities and also the state has received a renewed attention by sociologists and politicologists (Tilly, 1985) . But the attention given to the state has become a matter of increasing critique and debate. Such critiques have been given by legal anthropologists themselves in critical evaluation of earlier descriptions and analyses of tribal and village social and legal systems, but it has also been given by sociologists who complained that in legal anthropology, the state had been undertheorized (5).
But let me return to my starting point, that is the colonial state. Without any doubt the colonial state and its administration had in Togo (6), as elsewhere in colonial Africa, an oppressing and despotic character, but the violence which constituted the base of this despotism, had only its effects, if the control of the colonial administration was effective, which was mostly not the case (Spittler, 1981) . This use of violence could be attributed to the fact that the colonial administrator had a limited knowledge and information of the colonized people and therefore violence made up partly this lack of information.
Most African peasant societies, however, were remarkably able to defend themselves against the methods of coercion simply by migration. This self-defence is known, since Hyden's famous book about the Ujamaa system in Tanzania (1980), as the "uncaptured peasants" and is comparable to those peasants, who, in pre-colonial days, withdrew themselves from their chief's authority with whom they had a client relationship by moving away and resettling somewhere else (7).
We know that this image of the uncaptured peasant is all too simple, because farmers also have to pay taxes, they have to pay brideprices, they like to buy transistor radios, motorcycles and so on (Geschiere, 1984) . Therefore they are forced to grow other crops than they use for their own consumption and they have, although sometimes very reluctantly, to penetrate into the national market economy (De Haan, 1988) .
After more than 25 years of independence, many African states can hardly be considered to be "states" in Weber's definition, whose concept is that a "state" has essentially to consist of an apparatus of government with a monopoly of force over its territorial jurisdiction and population. African states came into existence, with a few exceptions, without possessing the means of force required to compel the colonial power to withdraw and moreover, since independence, there have been African Governments which have for extended periods been unable to hold an effective monopoly of force throughout their territorial jurisdiction (Bgoya & Hyden, 1987; Jackson & Rosberg, 1985) .
Whereas the colonial state was run by a small but ruthless bureaucracy, the emergent state lacked, especialy in the beginning, the administrative structures, the personnel and the culture necessary for an efficient management and organization of a state. The only response to all this was "statization" of almost all aspects of socio-economic and political life of the people which, of course, necessitated the expansion of bureaucracy. What is important, however, is that this did no increase efficiency of the state and its political and legal institutions.
In both colonial and post-colonial years, Togo got used to the practice of an "unlimited government", especially after the creation of the One Party, the Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT). As a result the Togolese people felt intimidated. The emphasis on the State as the principal development actor has further reinforced an attitude of apathy. Let me give an example:
Filming in March 1990 a public meeting in Aného, South Togo, organized by the top of the One Party for a so-called "révalorisation des valeurs et des concepts de notre Parti Unique", one got the uncomfortable feeling that the people sat back and were not involved at all in the whole affair. One was not interested, and a young man whispered "this is all bla-bla, what we simply need is the reopening of the railway track to Lomé which was already constructed by the German colonists". After the meeting this young man was arrested, but luckily enough one of the most important chiefs of the town with his close connections to the upper levels in the Party, got him out of prison.
It shows us, however, that Togo has become a country without people's participation in public affairs, although nowhere else this idea of people's participation has been more widely embraced than by Eyadéma, the Head of State since 1967. The president considers the Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais as the "creuset national", the national melting-pot in which everybody can and has to participate. This example leads us to the other actor of the balance of power, to the traditional chief, or what I often called elsewhere (van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1976; 1987 b) the "neo-traditional authority". Certainly, I do know that through a lot of legal reforms, sometimes already started in colonial days, chieftaincy was robbed of its legitimacy and went underground (Bayart, 1989; Moore, 1978; van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1987 a) (8) .
Despite legal and administrative reforms in Togo (Laloum, 1961; van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1976) , chiefs still continue to play an important role, not only as mediators between the bureaucrats of the state and the villagers, but also as the personification of a moral and political order, as the protection against injustice, unseemly behaviour, evil and calamity (9). In such a way, chiefs are "uncaptured". This means in practice, as far as Togo concerns, that they are still active in the field of settling disputes and the local policy as well (van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, documentary film Between the Scylla and Charibdis, forthcoming).
However, what is untrue for peasants, can not be true for chiefs. Not only by legal reforms the power of the chief has been curtailed, but more important is that a candidate for a chief's function in Togo has to be screened by a so-called enquête de moralité introduced already by the colonial government. This enquête de moralité is carried out in a very meticulous way, by the local police and gendarmerie. In this way, the government is able to form a body of chiefs which is -on the surface at least -loyal to the regime of Eyadéma. Thus the government in Togo continues colonial practices and is still the most important player in the game leading up to the election and appointment of a chief.
But this leads us to an intriguing question how ordinary people in Togo view the election campaign itself. People are undoubtedly aware that they will be asked to support, during the campaign conducted by various pretenders to the vacant throne, candidates, who, if elected, will above all be loyal to the State. After all, it is the State to which the chiefs nowadays owe part of their political power and which provides a legitimate base for their power. Against this background, it would be hardly surprising if the people no longer had any desire to expend their energy on candidates who are only going to do what the central government expects of them anyway. To put it more bluntly, why should the people take any heed of the election campaign, abandon their work in the field and devote both time and money to the campaign, if they have the strong feeling that the outcome of the election has already been decided upon anyway as a result of the intervention of the State, and especially by the intervention of the Head of State ?
If this hypothesis is true, then the role played by the State effectively destroys the image of any democratic interdependency between the traditional political leaders and the people. Anthropological literature ( Busia, 1951; Gbiki-Bénissan, 1976; Goldschmidt, 1981; Iliffe, 1987; Ladouceur, 1979; Ogot, 1964; Ottenberg, 1971; Seepapitso IV, 1989 ) paints a picture of chiefship as forming a kind of democracy involving the participation of the entire local community in any election for a new chief. The system is organised in such a way that the most senior chiefs try to get in touch with people who are unable to hold any sort of political post on account of their (low) social status. Thus arises a sort of interdependency between the traditional political leader and the people. But nowadays due to this state intervention people will tend to feel more and more that the election campaign is not conducted for their benefit, and that they have no real influence over the result.
On the other hand, however, the destruction of the interdependency has also the effect of undermining the authority of the Togolese chief. The people nowadays might hence be inclined to look upon the state intervention as a welcome change. This would lead to the hypothesis that a key stimulus for the Togolese state to penetrate the traditional system of power and authority is the knowledge that the majority of the people could realize that state intervention is a means of relieving the pressure which the chiefs were previously able to exert. In other words, the people no longer risk being subjected to the whims and economic and political exploitation of the traditional ruling classes. Or to put things more simply, the people finally have an opportunity, thanks to the intervention of the Togolese state, to liberate themselves from the oppressive material and mental burden which the election campaigns represent for them (lO) .What this effectively means is that the people can play the most undemanding role of "amused onlookers".
But there is another mechanism through which the Togolese government smoothly captured and succeeded easily to integrate the traditional political elite into the National Unity Party, and thus into the Togolese state. In 1968, the National Union of Togolese Chiefs (Union Nationale des Chefs Traditionnels au Togo, UNCTT) was founded and shortly afterwards the Union offered its full support to Eyadéma to set up the National Unity Party (Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais, RPT, see below). This support was highly appreciated by Eyadéma, because at that moment his government badly needed public assistance to legitimate his brand new administration (in 1967 he acceded to power).
Chieftaincy and the Togolese Government
In Togo the chiefs still play an important role in the interaction between the local government and the administration (van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1987b) . To date, only very little attention has been paid by scholars to the role of the chiefs, with all their social, legal and political activities. This is quite surprising, since the authority vested in them under folk law could easily turn out to be a crucial factor in future attempts to bring about socio-economic and governmental changes in Africa (Skalnflc, 1983; . This is something that applies to states in which the chiefs remain an effective source of authority, albeit within certain well-defined limits many cases are the result of the workings both of the central government and of economic and political change.
After the various declarations of independence in the 1960s, there was often a strained relationship between the new, modernised state governments and the chiefs, who were accused of corrupt collaboration with the colonial authorities. In certain cases, the tension even erupted into open conflict (11). Chiefs were frequently regarded by post-colonial governments as representing all that was old and conservative, and as forming an obstacle to modernisation. The tension resulted in problems particularly in those cases in which there was no clear delineation of the powers of the two systems of government and where their powers even overlapped. This situation still exists in various African states. Also in Togo. The following is an interesting example from southern Togo which is intended to illustrate the problems involved here.
At the end of November 1987,1 met somewhere in Lomé a former "chef de la circonscription" (known as a "préfet" since 1981). He had spent only one year in office in one of the prefectures in the south of the country. Although I was aware that it was not unusual for such government officials to spend only a short period in office, I was nevertheless curious to hear why this had happened in his case. After all, being relieved of such an important post (the most important position below the Minister of the Interior) within one year of taking office is an indication that something may have gone wrong. This had indeed been the case, except that my informant had not had any difficulties with his superior, but rather with the local chief in Vogan.
My informant had been trained as a teacher, and had worked first at a primary school and subsequently in secondary education. He was very keen on philosophy and had never imagined he would ever hold a senior administrative post. However, there was a period, some time after independence, when Togo was faced with a dearth of well-trained government officials, and so it happened that the ranks of the civil service were swelled with people who had not had any relevant training. When he was appointed "chef de la circonscription" in the district of Vogan in 1975, it was not long before he realised that he was being dragged into a hotbed of problems, presented to him not only by his own staff, but especially by the body of chiefs, each of whom was interested in pursuing only his own interests.
The direct cause of his fall was the following. Shortly after his installation as "chef de la circonscription", he made a tour of the district and noticed that there was a small, but very lively, market next to the chiefs palace in the district capital. He enquired about it, and learned that the market tolls were being paid to the chief in question, who was not passing them on to the tax authorities. The "chef de la circonscription" made it clear that this was against the rules of government, and
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instructed one of his clerks to collect the tolls in future. He informed his superior, the Minister of the Interior, about his action, but received no response from the Ministry. Nor was there any response from the chief. The latter, however, had in the meantime also contacted the Minister of the Interior.
The "chef de la circonscription" had grossly underestimated the power of the chief. After all, not only was he the leader of his people, but he was also a person who was known throughout the country, a devout catholic who had been received by Pope Pius XII in Rome, on excellent terms with the ruler of the country, and, last but not least, chairman of the UNCTT. The Minister had no choice but to summon both officials to his ministry. The best that the "chef de la circonscription" could achieve was a compromise by which the market tolls were to be divided equally between the chief and the district authorities. Although the chief grudgingly gave his consent to the compromise, he made it eminently clear that he felt he had been wronged, not only by the removal of a source of income, but also by the "chef de la circonscription's" behaviour, which he regarded as an encroachment on his authority as a traditional leader. The consequences of the incident soon made themselves felt. The "chef de la circonscription" was dismissed six months later.
One would, however, be ignoring the social, legal and political reality if one denied that the position and authority of the chiefs in Togo, as in many African states had been severely eroded, and that some of them were in fact no more than puppets, with their strings pulled by the central government (van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1979; 1987a and b) . This is something of which everyone is aware, the chiefs themselves included. The focus of power has shifted, since the colonial era, to the prefects, some of whom even have their offices in buildings previously used by the former colonial government. Their power is given an unmistakeable visible aspect by the presence of policemen, soldiers and flags, and the continuous arrival and departure of cars carrying party bosses. In this respect, nothing has changed since the colonial era (Von Trotha, 1990 ).
In the opinion of the central government of Togo, the chiefs are in the first instance civil servants who are accountable to the local representative of central government, the prefect. By using the "enquête de moralité", the authorities screen all candidates for any vacant chieftain post and filter out any undesirables. As said before, the government thus became a significant factor in the appointment of chiefs, awarding itself the role of "kingmaker" (Busia, 1951; Goldschmidt, 1981) .
This state intervention does, however, also lead to a certain competition between the "traditional" leaders (who derive their rights from folk law) and other leaders who are pushed forward by the government. In this way, tensions can easily arise in a community and the differences between "old" and "new" loyalties can become more and more pronounced (Geschiere, 1982) . But this state intervention does not always provide a firm guarantee that the state will be able to get exactly what it wants concerning the appointment of a chief. On some occasions, the state has to offer a compensation for its exercise of power, or at least to try to reach a compromise with the local community in which the chief will be appointed. A striking example of this was provided by an incident in the prefecture of Tchaüdjo, in the north of Togo.
Under folk law, the highest leader is the paramount chief (referred to as the "chef supérieur" ; Barbier, 1986) . In this particular prefecture, the paramount chief resides in Sokodé; he holds the honorary title of'uro esso" (literally meaning "Chief-God"), with six other chiefs under him. Although his initial role was that of "primus inter pares", the "Chief-God" was promoted to "chef supérieur" under French rule.
When the then "chef supérieur" of Tchaüdjo, Ayéva Issifou, died in 1980, a fierce battle began among the various candidates for his succession. Within the seven family groups who had a claim to the title under a complex system of rotation laid down by constitutional folk law, dozens of candidates came forward. An expensive and exhausting propaganda war began for the favour of the voters. Most candidates found themselves on the brink of bankruptcy after a while, and some of them actually went over the edge and were forced to withdraw from the race. In addition, the government conducted its own "enquête de moralité". In the end, by 1986, six years after the post had first become vacant, there were just four candidates left. These were given a fine, ceremonious reception by the Head of State, who then subjected them to a further lengthy interrogation, in the presence of various politicians, high-ranking military officers and police officers, on the question of their loyalty to the ideals of the National Unity Party. The President then sent them all outside, before calling them in again one by one. To three of them he gave large sums of money to defray the costs of their campaign. One of them, Ayéva Foudou, the son of the late "chef supérieur", received nothing, however. For everyone, this was a sign that he had finally been chosen by the government. During a triumphant return journey from Lomé to the north of the country, Ayéva Foudou was acknowledged as " chef supérieur", and preparations were made for the ritual ceremony to celebrate his installation.
He was, in fact, a fairly natural choice. After all, not only was he well educated (he had been trained as an agronomist), but he had also served formany years as secretary of the local branch of the National Unity Party. But his appointment by the President did not go without compensation: Ayéva Foudou's close supporters managed to force the government to agree "in camera" that he could still use the title of "chef supérieur", and be paid accordingly, despite the fact that this title had been explicitly abolished under a ministerial order issued in 1982 as being no longer appropriate in present-day Togo. It was,in fact, just a bit of window-dressing. During my stay in november 1988 people continued to complain, albeit in private, about the fact that the President ignored the system of rotation in appointing a candidate who would not have been eligible for election under the rules of folk law. In this respect, the Togolese government adhered closely to the policy of the French colonists in appointing someone who was acceptable to them rather than the appropriate candidate under folk law.
This particular case also illustrates the resistance of political traditions to modem authority (Skalnik, 1983; . The traditional custom is not to appoint a successor after the death of a chief until the burial rites have been completed (van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1987a) . This is something which takes a long time, during which there is no chief in office. For many years now, the government has wanted to limit the interregnum between the death of a chief and the appointment of a successor to two years. In 1980, the Union Nationale des Chefs Traditionnels au Togo (UNCTT) itself made recommendations on these lines to the government, stating that action was needed in order to "put an end to the abuse of power and the machinations of ambitious power-seekers whose only aim is to disrupt law and order in our villages". Tough language though this may be, one wonders whether it was spoken by the chiefs themselves without prompting from the high-ranking National Unity Party officials who sit on the UNCTT. A letter written in 1982 by the Minister of the Interior (who is responsible for the chiefs) makes clear that this recommendation was put into effect, and that the interregnum is generally much longer than two years simply because of the delay there would seem to be on each occasion before a successor is appointed. The government must, however, have noticed the administrative stagnation that occurs during such an interregnum, given that the local authorities are not able to carry out their duties in all comers of their districts -which are often immense in size -without the assistance of the chiefs.
Togo and Eyadema
Togo was a German colony from 1884 to 1914. In only two weeks in August 1914, it was conquered both by British troops from the Gold Coast (Ghana) and by the French, coming from Dahomey (Benin). The majority of the former German colony came under French rule and decided in 1956 to join the French community. Four years later, it became fully independent (Cornevin, 1987; Harrison Church, 1988) .
During a long period following independence, the country was in a permanent state of tumult, a reason for Eyadéma to seize power on the 13th of January 1967. He is now one of the longest-serving presidents in Africa. It could be said that Eyadéma is Togo, and that to talk about Togo is to talk about Eyadéma (12) .
Irnmediately after Eyadéma's coup in January 1967, the constitution was suspended and all political parties were dissolved. It was not until 1979 that a new constitution came into force (Leclerq, 1980) . During the intervening period, from 1967 to 1979, the country was ruled by presidential ordonnances and decrees. Unlike many other military regimes, this particular military regime apparently did not feel any immediate need to provide a legitimate basis for its authority through a constitution (Reyntjens, 1986; Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1989; Wodie Vangah, 1990) . The origins of the Togolese constitution of 1979 are closely connected with the "Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais" (RPT), the National Unity Party. During a RPT congress on 30 August 1979, Eyadéma decided -ten years after the party's foundation -that the military regime needed a constitution. Eyadéma also announced, during the very same congress, that he was intending to step down in order to pave the way towards a multi-party system. This was nothing new; he had already made identical announcements in 1969 and 1971. The effects in 1979 were exactly the same as in previous years: the people assembled (of their own accord?) in large numbers around the presidential palace in Lomé, and demanded that Eyadéma stay on. Telegrams and other messages of support poured in from all kinds of sources, all of them urging the president not to resign. The general gave in to the demands, and continued as head of state.
Whatever the reasons may have been for Eyadéma's desire to resign from office, there can be no doubt that his image and charisma have benefited from having expressed such a desire. The personality cult became more intense since then, to such an extent that even the Togolese are inclined to be irritated by it. Eyadéma must definitely have known that, at that very moment, there was little likelihood of the country returning to its old multi-party system: after all, all political parties had been dissolved in 1967, and the only political organisation in existence was the RPT, which he had founded himself. In order therefore to provide the RPT with a constitutional basis, a resolution was passed at an extraordinary party congress (27 to 28 November 1979) in which the RPT's policy-making committee was "invited" to give effect to an earlier resolution to draw up a draft constitution. This draft was accepted on 30 December 1979. On the same date, the sole presidential candidate, Eyadéma, was re-elected virtually unanimously as head of state (Church, 1988 (Church, :1043 ).
Eyadéma's One Party, the Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais and the Chiefs
On 30 August 1969, Eyadéma launched the idea of a National Unity Party, the "Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais", which he intended to act as a "melting-pot in which all the country's 'forces vitales' could blend together", as he himself put it (Cornevin, 1987; Feuillet, 1976; Prouzet, 1976; Toulabor, 1986; Verdier, 1978;  HISTOIRE PU TOCO IL ÉTAIT UNE TOIS...
CET OUVRAGE A ÉTÉ RÉALISÉ PAR. Yagla, 1978 ). Togo's one-party system was born. The first major positive reaction to this step came from the chiefs, who passed a resolution at their annual congress on 21 September 1969 in which they expressed unanimous support for the new movement and its founder. This was just a year after the foundation of the Union Nationale des Chefs Traditionnels au Togo (Gbiki-Bénissan, 1976:383) . Very little was heard from the UNCTT during the subsequent years until 1986, when the RPT decided to incorporate the UNCTT in the National Unity Party. Almost 20 years after its foundation, the UNCTT became member of the RPT, a so-called aile marchante, a marching wing of the RPT. In public the chiefs praised the President for that decision, but during interviews I had with some of them, they showed, in guarded terms, however, that this (forced) integration was a further step of encapsulating the chief into the state and its political institutions, a further loss of autonomy. In the same year, the UNCTT was given a direct line to the Central Committee of the RPT after the chairman of the UNCTT joined the Central Committee and thus became, from a political viewpoint, one of the most prominent chiefs in the country.
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At the same time, there is the further issue of whether or not the African national unity parties may be regarded as being capable of dealing adequately with the various problems which a modern government should solve. One of the most intriguing problems in this respect is whether the one-party system, as an example of a modem African form of government and a political system, does not itself represent a structural and fundamental weakness which has the effect of more or less preventing effective local government. This problem becomes particularly acute when one bears in mind that each National Unity Party uses its power to decree that the government of its state should be organised in a manner which accords with its own views of how things should ideally be done (as is of course typical of any one-party state). In such a case, it is the party's ideals, as laid down in the party's constitution and in some cases in a national constitution, which lend legitimacy to the form of government. In order to achieve this ideal form of government, it is necessary in any event for all high-ranking government officials to be members of the National Unity Party, for them to be totally loyal to the party, and to show their loyalty openly. This also applies to the chiefs. This may be illustrated by an example taken from day-to-day legal practice.
Since the land laws were enacted in 1974 (Améga & Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1979), an attempt was made to stick to the principle of allowing land to be managed only by people who are capable of using it successfully. The local government was given the task of enforcing these land tenure law reform. One would be justified in wondering whether the government has the necessary instruments at its disposal for putting this principle (i.e. "distribuer la terre à ceux qui peuvent l'utiliser") effectively into practice. A seemingly minor, but nevertheless significant, incident pointing to the fact that this is indeed not the case, occurred in September 1988 on the outskirts of Lomé. The city is gradually expanding further to the north, and the city council therefore wished to expand to the territory of a neighbouring village, Agoe Nyeve. The villagers, however, were fiercely opposed to such a move. The "chef de canton"(13), who also happened to be the chairman of the Union Nationale des Chefs Traditionnels du Togo and as such, acted also as a member of the Central Committee of the RPT, felt himself really between two different kinds of loyalities. In this situation he proved unable to calm his people's emotions. The state then brought in the gendarmes, on the grounds that the Land Tenure law of 1974 needed to be enforced. They too were unsuccessful.
One-party systems in Africa lead to oppression and the subjection of the members of the state to a range of coercive measures. For example, only party members are eligible for official posts, or for promotion from one post to another. It may be one of the reasons why an efficient form of government has not been developed so far. Another, no less important, question is whether a national unity party does not form an excellent vehicle for the maintenance of undemocratic traditions in African societies. A one-party system could presumably act as a breeding ground for a sort of community spirit, i.e. operate as what Eyadéma describes as a "creuset national". At the same time, precisely this feature is an essential aspect of the undemocratic principles of folk law. In this way, the one-party system becomes the means by which despotism (no new phenomenon in Africa, of course) achieves its own legitimacy as well as, in the case of Togo, à constitutional basis by incorporating a clause in the constitution stating that the national unity party is to play a dominant role in the politics of the country.
As a result of their position in relation to the central government and the National Unity Party, the chiefs in Togo occupy a pivotal position (van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1987b) . On the one hand, they have regular relations with administrators and party officials; on the other hand, they act as the representative of their subjects vis-à-vis the government and the party. The chiefs have thus acquired two power bases: the first is the administrative and political machinery of the state, and the network associated with it; the second is a form of government founded on folk law of which the chief is both a member and the leader (in other words, he forms the centre of an extremely extensive network of "subjects"). Although these two networks may strengthen the chief's position, this is not necessarily so. It depends on whether the chief in question is capable of performing his pivotal function well, taking due account of both sides of the fulcrum, i.e. both people and state. This is largely subjected to the individual qualities of the chief.
For many chiefs, however, this ambivalence is a source of persistent concern, as is illustrated by the minutes of the first round-table conference of the Commission Nationale des Droits de l 'Homme in 1989 (van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1990b . A well-known chief from the prefecture Kioto in southern Togo, Yao Gassou IV, expressed his worries as follows:
"In his speech, Chief Gassou stressed the fact that the traditional chiefs, who had been all-powerful during the pre-colonial era, had seen their power eroded step by step during the period starting with the colonisation of the country and stretching right up to the present day. As far as he was concerned, the law enacted in 1961 to reorganise the court system (Laloum, 1961; vanRouveroy vanNieuwaal, 1976) had reduced the chiefs' powers considerably by discontinuing their right to do justice and confirming them in a simple conciliatory role.
The second reason for the chiefs' loss of authority, explained Chief Gassou, was a lack of familiarity with matters at hand, which certain of their number had demonstrated. The usurpation of the chiefs' power, of which a number of local party bosses had been guilty during the years up to 1967, had also contributed to the loss of authority among the "guarantors of tradition", as he described the village chiefs. In Chief Gassou ' s opinion, the loss of authority among the village chiefs was not caused by the creation of the Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme, but was a social phenomenon evolving from the countless changes affecting our modern world. In order to solve the problem before the situation became irreversible, Chief Gassou proposed granting powers to the village and district chiefs, organising regular refresher courses and regularly reminding those under their jurisdiction of their duties in order to instill a sense of respect towards the chiefs. "(14)
I would like to illustrate the above problems with one of the many examples from day-to-day practice in Togo. It concerns the position of Esse Erateï, "chef de canton" in the prefecture of Bafdo (northern Togo).
The qualities ofEssô Erateï are praised far and wide. He is said, for example, to possess certain supernatural powers which allow him to identify witches. He is an impressive man whose election in 1977 was the cause of great controversy. It was the President himself who cut the final knot and chose him as "chef de canton". The election was exciting to the very last: eye-witnesses claim without reservation to have seen poisonous snakes under the rostrum on which Essô Erateï was standing, and say that these had been laid there by his opponents. However, his supernatural powers meant that he was immune to any danger.
His authority was nonetheless dealt a forceful blow in September 1988, when he became involved in a marital conflict between two Fulbe (or FulanilPeuhl a nomadic people of West Africa). He took sides with the wife, fell in love v,ith her, and took her into his home. Some say in private that she even bore him a child. The husband, a man whom many feared on account of his knowledge of supernatural forces, swore that Esso Erateï would not die a chief. For his part, Esso Erateï tried to have the curse lifted. Whether he was bewitched or not, he certainly failed to behave with the dignity required of a "chef de canton" during a subsequent public meeting: he repeatedly interrupted the prefect's speech and was unable to control his bladder. The President promptly dismissed him from his post. Thanks to the intervention of the district officer, however, who did not believe the story of the curse and had heard the results of a medical examination on Essô Erateï, which had shown that he was suffering from an inflamed prostate, the chief was reinstated.
What does the future hold for him? There are many people who believe that, as long as the curse placed on him by the Fulbe is not lifted, his political career, and even his life, continues to hang by a thread.
It is a story that illustrates, apart from a number of other interesting matters, the political dependence of Togolese chiefs on the central government. There is a strong temptation to compare the story of Esso Erateï with that of Na Tyaba Tyekura, the paramount chief of the Anufom (a people living in N'zara (Mango, in northern Togo) who reigned from 1963 to 1978, when he was deposed in 1978 (van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1979) . Once he had fallen into disfavour with the central government (see van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1980) , his position became untenable, partly because a faction within his own community, which at that time maintained close relations with President Eyadéma, had managed to bring him into discredit. After his deposition he died a year later, in 1979, in suspicious circumstances in a hospital in Lomé.
Despite these examples, I would nevertheless hesitate to claim, as I have done in a different context (van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1989) , that the Togolese state is omnipresent and abides no authority other than its own. After all, a distinction needs to be made between: the administrative presence of the state in the daily lives of all Togolese citizens on the one hand and at the other hand the political presence of the representatives of the state who are at all times to be seen as representatives of the National Unity Party. It is particularly by the political presence of these state representatives that the state is "all-embracing" and highly dominant. The state itself also makes this persistently clear, not only by its representatives, but also by means of an extensive network of spies, which has the effect of turning a state ruled by a National Unity Party into a despotic system and of more or less ruling out any effective internal opposition. It is against this background that the foundation of the Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme in 1987 may well prove to have been of vital importance.
In a relatively small country like Togo, every citizen will undoubtedly regard the presence of the state through a network of spies as a threat. Nonetheless, the mere fact that the chiefs still play a prominent role in the day-to-day practice of law, despite legal reforms which have been effected and the resistance the chiefs encounter from within the administrative and the legal systems, tends to contradict to some extent the idea of an "all-embracing state". The following example provides a good illustration of this point. On this occasion, the "choc-groupe" was accompanied by a local youth band, one of whose members dared (not loudly, but obviously openly enough for it to be heard) to describe the meeting as a lot of "blah-blah " to the greater glory of the RPT, during which no one was prepared to listen to the views of young people. This was enough for the police to have him put behind bars immediately. The prefect took the matter up straightaway with one of the most prominent and most influential chiefs, of whom he knew that he was on good terms with senior government officials in Lomé. The prefect's hope in doing this was to secure the boy's release.
It is in the same spirit of mutual consultation between the local government and the traditional leaders that the prefect holds a session every Friday in his office in order to deal with conflicts about land rights which have not been resolved by the "Tribunal de première Instance" and which are in urgent need of resolution. Such sessions have now become a permanent feature in all prefectures, since the government realises that the chiefs are eminently well-placed, particularly on questions relating to land rights, to make an accurate assessment of the many complex relations involved.
The Relationship Between Lawyers and Chiefs
One of the prime functions performed by chiefs is undoubtedly that of dispute settlement. I have already discussed this function extensively in a number of publications and films 1987a and b; 1989; Baerends & van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1982) . Formally speaking, however, Togolese law denies the chiefs' important role, and it is my opinion that the law-makers continue to pay insufficient attention to the social function performed by the chiefs as settlers of disputes working alongside the judicial system established by the state. The members of the judiciary also generally seem not to wish to acknowledge the importance of their traditional counterparts. At the same time, I should add that more and more of the judges whom I have met in the last few years have been inclined to appreciate the value of the chiefs in local legal matters, particularly with regard to cases of witchcraft (Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1990a) .
It became, however, clear to me during my most recent visit to Togo in March 1990, that the senior members of the judiciary have been the subject of serious criticism by the government. Eyadéma himself launched the offensive in describing their practices in the following terms:
"The magistrates draw out cases by postponing them from one sitting to another. In many cases, once judgement is finally passed, the result depends entirely on whether the magistrate has taken a liking to the defendant or not. Curiously enough, when judgement is given in favour of the weaker of the parties, one detects an intolerable dilatoriness in its execution. The lawyers, who are entrusted with the task of defending their clients' interests, work out deals among themselves so that they can get rich on their clients' backs by embezzling funds paid by way of damages and interest which are intended to go to the victims. " (15) These words cannot have gone down well with many lawyers. Shortly afterwards, on 19 October 1988,1 had a conversation concerning the relationship between chiefs and lawyers with a prominent Togolese lawyer. The lawyer in question held a number of important political positions in addition to being vice chairman of the Cour d'Appel in Lomé: she was vice chairman of the Union Nationale des Femmes Togolaises, a member of the Central Committee of the National Unity Party and had been secretary of the Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme since 1987. She thought thatmy scholarly interest in chiefs was quite outrageous: "They are backward people, often illiterate, generally amenable to bribes, and an obstacle to the modernisation of the country." Here is an opinion that is undoubtedly shared by many Togolese lawyers.
Her resentment is understandable if one realises that the chiefs, in their capacity as adjudicators of disputes, form in the eyes of the established lawyers a threat to the integrity of the state judiciary. This is particularly the case in connection with questions of witchcraft, where the locals are familiar with the channels of communication with the chief and can follow procedures with which they are also familiar in order to solve a conflict or prevent a situation from getting any worse. The chiefs are better equipped than many well-educated judges to find appropriate outlets for tensions and emotions, thanks to their knowledge of local society and politics, their closeness to the people involved, their knowledge of the sense of justice that prevails in the local area, and more specifically their psychological perceptiveness (van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1990a) . Togolese lawyers are well aware of this situation and acknowledge sardonically that chiefs still play an important role in local legal affairs, despite the fact that they operate in competition with the state judges and effectively oppose them.
What are the Prospects for the Togolese Chiefs ?
The citizens of Togo regard the chiefs as personifications of the moral and political order, their protectors against injustice, improper behaviour, evil and calamity (van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1987a) . In that way, the chiefs continue, as in the past, to settle disputes. As a result, Togo's judicial system is built on two different cornerstones: that of the government and that of the chiefs. This can be a problem for people wishing to remedy an injustice: which of the two judiciary systems should they use? (von Benda-Beckmann, 1984; van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal & Baerends, 1977; Silliman, 1981) . On the other hand, the Togolese chief is firmly integrated with the administration of the State (van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1987b).
In Togo, but also in other African states, the chiefs therefore play an important administrative and legal role. It is difficult for the central government to acknowledge this openly, since it would mean acknowledging a weakness in the power of government. At the same time, a chief's authority is determined by the quality of his relations with his people, which depends partly on what he can offer his people. The latter would seem (and the word "seem" is operative here) to be declining at the moment, because a chief's subjects are becoming ever more dependent on the state for their socio-economic needs: the state provides facilities such as schooling, health care, technology and farming loans. In addition, the state is now one of the largest employers, if not the largest employer, in the country. All the social, economic and political changes that have taken place have greatly affected the authority of the chiefs. It is no surprise that many of them have not always been able to take adequate account of them in their administration of government and justice.
If, however, the traditional leaders in Togo are able to build up a new position within this changing context, or maintain their present position, there is every chance of their withstanding the ravages of time. Put otherwise, the chiefs will survive as an institution only if they adapt themselves to the changing reality, both inwardly towards their own people, and outwardly towards the state. If they prove incapable of doing so, then their role will soon come to an end, and historians will write of their having committed political suicide.
The Togolese President gives the impression of understanding this extremely complex situation in which the Togolese chiefs now find themselves. During a conversation I conducted in 1989 with the President's right-hand man, the Minister of the Interior, I was told that the President was frequently at a loss to comprehend why people should want to hold the office of chief, particularly as there is, officially at least, hardly any financial reward to be gained. But besides that, dealing with the state with its own interests and with his own people with its aims sometimes totally different to the first ones, the chiefs are really caught between Scylla and Charibdis. As achieving the right balance in dealings with the state, on the one hand and the people on the other can simply cause all problems to multiply. In this context, it is understandable that the President should offer the chiefs a moral boost by praising them as "guardians of our cultural values and identity". The chiefs in Lomé and its surroundings are always invited to welcome important guests upon their arrival at Lomé Airport. The Togolese television company has been given strict instructions to broadcast footage of the chiefs greeting President Eyadéma at such meetings as a means of illustrating the good relationship that exists between the two. Not that the chiefs are entirely free to refuse such invitations, by the way: no chief who is interested in maintaining his position would miss an event like this. Absence would be interpreted as disloyalty to the regime, and would lead to either suspension or dismissal from office.
The general belief in Togo is that Eyadéma appreciates that the chiefs still satisfy a number of social requirements. For this reason, he is willing to allow them to exercise certain powers under folk law and within certain limits formulated by the government. Moreover, by his behaviour towards the chiefs in public, the President gives the impression of realising that good relations with these representatives of the local and social order are beneficial to his own legitimacy, in spite of the fact that the latter has been firmly established in the constitution since 1980. But he misses not any opportunity of letting the chiefs know in no uncertain terms exactly who is in charge of the country.
What does this policy mean in practice? Is the President's support for the chiefs nothing more than hollow words, his way of paying lip service to the traditional leaders who the government realises play in many respects an important role in the everyday lives of the people? Is it a policy that is restricted to appearances only? Has the government tied up the chiefs completely so that they are no longer able to exercise any autonomy at all? In short, does central government take the chiefs seriously, or is its apparent respect for them merely a front?
Today's Togolese chiefs are in a precarious situation. This is not only in the sense that the survival of the chiefs with all their functions is in jeopardy, but also because an African-style democracy is at stake. After all, better understanding and more respect of the chief's authority could simply act as an encouragement to decentralization and debureaucratization. Decentralization and debureaucratization are essential means to change the present situation of an oppressing and almost suffocating role of the One Party. By decentralization is not meant, as Bgoya and Hyden put it (1987: 25) , the "transfer of power to lower levels of a centrally controlled government. Such an exercise, as experience from many African countries suggests, only multiplicates bureaucratic structures. It enhances state capacity for oppressing. Decentralization, therefore, must in the future entail strengthening various form of local government as well as non-governmental organizations. Only by reducing the stake at each level and in every public institution -as chieftaincy is -will there be a way of bringing about greater democracy". But if the Togolese government formally acknowledged the chiefs ' authority in this way, this would signal in a sense that the state recognised that its own authority had failed, or in any event that it was not effective.
In the light, however, of the call for démocratisation and the opening up of the political system to more than one party, the (neo-)traditional leaders in Togo could well end up playing a more important role within the legal and administrative systems than they are capable of doing at present. The developments in this particular area are not without importance, given that the welfare of African citizens is at stake. I shall be interested to see how things develop. 
